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ABSTRACT 
Should the trustees of educational institutions sell their 
investments in companies doing business in South Afri_ca? Discussions 
of this question have tended to generate more heat than light, partly 
because role expectations for trustees are not well defined but also 
because the differences between public and private roles are not well 
understood. In both of these respects the question of South African 
investments is typical of many of the moral problems that arise in 
periods of rapid social change. An analysis of some of the concepts 
underlying this disagreement should therefore have a wider relevance. 
Accordingly, in the first three sections of this paper the kinds of 
situations which are likely to be morally problematic are redefined in 
terms ot conflicts over role expectation•, especially conflicts 
between expectations for private and for public roles. In the last 
section of the paper the distinctions introduced in the first three 
sections are applied to the question of South .\frican investments. 
Though it is not to be expected that this analysis will dissolve the 
disagreement over divestment, disputants may at least learn what it is 
that they are disputing about. 
PUBLIC ROLES, PRIVATE ROLES, AND THE 
QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTMENTS* 
W. T. Jones 
A dean of Balliol College, Oxford , in the years just after 
World War I, is said to have enlivened long winter evenings by leading 
a coterie of undergraduate friends in raids on the rooms of other 
undergraduates whom he and they disliked; on mornings after these 
forays he would suuunon the offenders to his office and fine them 
heavily for having damaged college property. If this dean is not 
apocryphal he had an astonishing capacity for confusing social roles. 
As dean he should not have incited undergraduates; as friend, he 
might. As friend he should not have fined undergraduates; as dean he 
must. But apocryphal or not, the story points up a central feature of 
many moral problems: the difficulty of deciding which of several 
possible social roles is most appropriate in a particular set of 
circumstances. 
* I am indebted to so many people -- at one time or another I 
have discussed the investment issue with virtually everyone I 
know -- that I can list here only those who read and commented 
helpfully on the first draft of this paper -- Jay Atlas, Bruce 
Cain, Molly Mason Jones, Alan Schwartz and Charles Young. I am 
also grateful to the philosophy faculty at California State 
University Los Angeles for the stimulating and instructive dis­
cussion that followed my presentation of a part of this paper at 
a colloquiuu there. 
An example of this difficulty is a monarch who wishes to marry 
a divorcee. A second example is a lawyer who learns that one of his 
partners is an embezzler.1 A third is the faculty member of a tenure 
review committee who is a close personal friend of the individual 
under review. The roles differ in these three cases, but they have a 
common feature: each is an instance of a conflict between a 
(relatively) public and a (relat ively) private role. And though there 
can certainly be conflicts between the expectations of two public 
roles and those of two private roles, one of the most interesting kind 
of conflict is one between public and private roles, where the 
conflict is due less to objective complexities than to a failure to 
take into account the differences between public and private roles. 
Since, for reasons I will discuss later, I think that this failure is 
a typically modern -- not to say typically late twentieth-century --
confusion, I shall devote the two central sections of this paper to 
pointing up the distinctions between public and private roles. But I 
shall begin with a discussion of the relations, generally, between 
role expectations and moral choices, and I shall conclude the paper 
with an application of this analysis to a matter of current concern, 
the investments that many American colleges and universities hold in 
companies doing business in South Africa. 
I 
Role Expectations and Moral Choices 
What is the link between role, a sociological concept, and 
duty, an ethical concept? I believe that Hume's analysis of the idea 
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of natural necessity can be extended to the idea of duty, or moral 
necessity. According to Hume, the: 
idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a 
number of similar instances which occur of the constant 
conjunction of these events • • • •  But there is nothing 
in a number of instances, different from every single 
instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except 
only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the 
mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one 
event, to expect its usual attendant • • • • 2 
If I release a rock which I have been holding in my hand, there is no 
�why it should fall; it might just as well, as far as the nature 
of things goes, fly upward into the air or burst out singing "Rock of 
Ages Cleft for Me. 11 But as a matter of fact, it has never leapt into 
air or burst into song; it has always fallen. Because it has always 
fallen, I expect it to fall on the next similar occasion, and I 
mistakenly attribute my expectation � which is only a subjective 
The feeling in me -- to a natural necessity in the physical world. 
so-called laws of physics (e.g., the law of gravity) thus dissolve 
into observed regularities to which we have attached a feeling of 
expectation. This expectation, ''which we feel in the mind, this 
customary transition of the imagination from one obj ect to its usual 
attendant, " is the sole source of "the idea of power or necessary 
connexion. 113 
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So far Hume. A similar account can be given of moral laws and 
moral necessity. The duty we feel to perform such-and-such acts does 
not arise from the nature of those acts, for any frequently repeated 
act will come to be experienced as entailing an obligation to perform 
it. Rather, it arises from the fact that the act in question has been 
repeated so often that we have come to count on it's being performed 
again in similar circumstances. 
As an example, consider a young king who has come to the 
throne after the long reign of an autocratic father. Uncertain who 
will best serve him as his ministers, he seeks, and accepts, the 
advice of his privy council. This creates an expectation, however 
slight, on the part of the privy councillors that they will be 
consulted regarding the next vacancy in the ministry. Perhaps it also 
creates a slight expectation on the part of the young king that he 
will again consult them. If he does so, this strengthens both the 
councillors' and the king's expectations that the council will be 
consulted. In due course, what was initially experienced merely as an 
expectation of future behavior comes to be experienced, merely because 
the expectation has been repeatedly satisfied, as the king's duty 
not merely something that he does but something that he ought to 
do. 
Thus defeated expectations regularly generate moral 
indignation. And if the king has internalized these expectations he 
will feel the same weight of moral censure (self blame), whenever he 
fails to consult his councillors, that his councillors level against 
him. Moral censure and self-blame operate powerfully to induce the 
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king to satisfy, and in satisfying to strengthen, the councillors' 
expectations, and eventually the practice of consultation will be 
incorporated in the constitution of the kingdom. Now it becomes 
enforceable by legal sanctions, in addition to the merely suasive 
force of social disapproval. It is practice, then, and the 
expectations arising from practice that make it morally binding on the 
young king to consult his privy council. His autocratic father 
certainly never did, and nobody so much as dreamed that he ought to. 
And in neighboring kingdoms no such constitutional provision exists or 
is thought of. 
These remarks apply generally. Every social role (e.g. , that 
of king or privy councillor) consists in a set of specific behavioral 
responses CR1, R2, R3 ••• ) in specific social circumstances Cc1, c2, 
c3 ••• ) .  What the specific response in any specific circumstance is, 
depends on a variety of factors (e.g. , the age, temperament and 
experience of the agent) .  But the occurrence of response R1, whatever 
it happens to be, in circumstance c1, creates, both in the agent and 
in those with whom he is interacting, a slight expectation that when 
c1 recurs he will again do R1• Every repetition of R1 in c1 
strengthens this expectation. Strong expectations regarding 
behavioral responses in social situations thus come to be experienced 
as morally compelling, just as expectations generated by repeated 
occurrences of natural events come to be experienced as physically 
necessary. But the necessity -- physical in the case of natural 
events; moral in the case of social behaviors -- is not in the events 
or the behaviors. They are just what they are. The necessity in both 
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cases is something "we feel in the mind" as a result of the 
regularities we have observed. 
This way of describing the relation between role expectations 
and duty will be resisted by those who want to hold that some acts are 
"right" (absolutely right) and others "wrong" (wrong under any and all 
circlliilstances) .  It is of course a psychological fact, these critics 
will say, that people tend to feel obliged to do what they and others 
have come to expect them to do, but that is irrelevant to the question 
whether they are really obliged. The account given in the last few 
pages overlooks the all-important difference between feeling obliged 
and being oDliged. Consider the following example. Suppose that 
Germany had won World War II, as it very nearly did. The Nazi 
practice of exterminating Jews and other "racially inferior" peoples 
would then have become universal; it would have been taught in 
schools, preached from pulpits, disseminated by the media, and 
enforced by law. In such circumstances people would undoubtedly come 
to believe they had a duty to exterminate Jews. Surely, I will be 
asked, you don't maintain that, in these circumstances, they would be 
really oDliged to exterminate Jews? Isn't it evident that, despite 
their own and other people's expectations for them, they still have a 
duty .!!.Q!_ to exterminate Jews? 
This is a powerful, indeed an unanswerable, counter-example as 
long as we exempt ourselves from the supposed universality of the Nazi 
system and so, unobserved even by ourselves, survive to condemn that 
system from the point of view of our own different expectations. Thus 
it is with us as it was with those unobserved observers of their own 
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death whom Lucretius wrote about. In a well-known passage in the de 
Rerum Natura Lucretius asks how people who are convinced of the 
mortality of the soul can yet fear death. The reason, he says, is 
that they "do not remove and cast themselves root and branch out of 
life, but all unwittingly suppose something of themselves to live on. "  
Thus, conjuring up pictures o f  their dead bodies "mangled by birds and 
beasts, they pity themselves. 114 
So we unwittingly falsify the conditions specified in the 
counter-example. Because the Nazi system stands condemned even when 
it seems to have become universal and every different expectation has 
been eliminated, we conclude that it must be condemned by an objective 
and eternal moral order; we overlook the fact that we have not 
eliminated ourselves and that it is we and our own expectations who 
are condemning it. In a word, the universal Nazi system of the 
counter-example is not universal as long as� reject it; if it were 
to become truly universal, the question of condemnation would be moot; 
it could not arise. 
Our belief in the eternity and objectivity of some (any) 
system of expectations is a function of our allegiance, our 
commitment, to that system, one more example of our tendency to 
project something we feel in the mind out into the world as a part of 
the nature of things. This explains why the counter-example seems at 
first sight so powerful; but its power is that of emotion, not of 
logic: it is simply a reflection of our horror at anti-semitism. The 
horror we feel causes us to reject the thought � to refuse even to 
imagine the possibility -- that the Nazi system of expectation could 
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ever supercede our own. But of course we know, if only we can bring 
ourself to acknowledge the knowledge, that in the immense sweep of 
human history and in the immense variety of human societies many 
different systems of expectations have existed, and that to these 
different systems different people at different times have made 
commitments, and experienced ontological confusions, identical with 
our own. 
Even in the same society at different times, different 
responses come to be associated with a particular role and are so 
experienced as obligatory . The expectations attached to particular 
roles therefore vary enormously; what is common to all roles is the 
effect of habit, by means of which an is (what is expected) is 
transformed into an ought (what ought to be done). In this way, in 
the course of time, systems of rights, claims, and obligations develop 
-- all because men and women are creatures of habit. But men and 
women are not completely creatures of habit. Morals are problematic 
precisely because of the tension between these two facts about human 
nature . 
Generally speaking, moral problems arise in the following 
kinds of circumstances. 
(1) Many of the expectations for most social roles, whether 
public or private, are well defined. Roger of Mor�emer must have 
known pretty well what was expected of him as a trusted vassal of 
William the Bastard, Duke of Normandy; he must have also known what 
was expected of him as a vassal of Ralph of Crepy, Count of .Amiens. 
Though his obligations to these two lords did not necessarily 
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conflict, they chanced to collide at the battle of Mortemer in 1054, 
when Roger, who was a general in William's army, took Ralph, who was 
serving in the French army, prisoner. What to do? He sheltered Ralph 
for three days and then returned him to the French side. 5 
This probably appeared to Roger as a conflict between the 
expectations of two private roles. In modern times roles of this kind 
have been shifted to the public domain (as with the conflict 
experienced by Robert E. Lee and other officers in the U. S. Army 
between their duty to their state and their duty to the United 
States). A more typical example, from today's perspective, of a 
conflict between private roles would be the problem a woman might 
experience in balancing the claims of her mother and of her daughter. 
Conflicts are also possible between a public role and a private role. 
For instance, one knows what is expected of one as a member of a 
tenure review committee; one also knows what is expected of one as a 
friend at least one knows what this friend expects of one, for he 
has taken care to make it plain. One's problem, if one believes the 
friend to be unqualified, is whether to act in one's role as friend or 
in one's role as faculty member. These are all conflicts between what 
we may call two "prima facie" duties6 -- duties generated by the 
different expectations of the two roles, and one has to decide which 
of these two prima f acie duties has the stronger claim. 
(2) A second kind of moral problem may arise when a conflict 
between two prima facie duties has been resolved, but one now 
experience a conflict between what is perceived to be the more 
pressing ot the two duties and what is felt to be an interest. One 
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can perfectly well know what is expected of him (and what he expects 
of himself) in these circumstances, and yet fail to do it. 
St. Paul's lament -- "I can will but cannot do what is right. 
I do not do the good things that I want to do; I do the wrong things 
that I do not want to do. What a wretched man I aml"7 -- is not 
often heard nowadays, sin having been secularized into psychosis, but 
the form of the conflict has not changed. Moral problems of this type 
are by no means rare. 
( 3) Can there also be a conflict between what is experienced 
as an unqualified duty and some role expectation? Many philosophers 
would answer affirmatively. To them it seems entirely possible that 
there can be a conflict between what they call a moral principle (such 
as the principle that human life ought to be preserved) and some role 
into which one has been cast (service in the army as a draftee) or for 
which one has deliberately opted ( judge, surgeon). 
This is only another version of the contention, which we have 
already examined, 8 that the whole content of the notion of duty cannot 
be captured by the concept of role expectation, but it requires a 
somewhat different reply. I believe that a moral principle is simply 
an expectation that has been artificially abstracted from all of the 
roles in which it is actually embedded. Behaviors that are specific 
to one and only one role (such as the behavior in a certain kind of 
constitutional monarchy of consulting one's privy council) are not 
likely to be abstracted from the role, but behaviors that are expected 
in many different roles are likely to be abstracted and considered 
apart from any and all roles; they then seem to be universally binding 
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expectations, role-transcendent expectations, as it were. 
It is possible, then, to account for why people come to think 
in terms of moral principles, just as it is possible to account for 
why they tend to attribute a special, "objective" status to their own 
system of expectations. Further, it is worth pointing out that 
thinking about a certain subset of expectations as having the status 
of moral principles has a very grave disadvantage. Because these 
expectations have been abstracted from their concrete settings in 
specific roles, they seem to have an obligatory force that puts them 
in opposition to, and gives them a moral priority over, any and all of 
the roles in which these expectations are actually embedded. Ordinary 
people -- and Aristotle -- recognize that the philosophers' moral 
principles are context-relative. People who would not think of lying 
in one social context lie freely in another, and without experiencing 
moral qualms when they do. But to say that truth-telling and 
promising-keeping and the other so-called moral principles are 
context-relative is to put them back into the varied roles from which 
the philosophers have abstracted them: it is to say that people 
commonly take into account the specific social role they happen to be 
performing at the time they find they have to choose between lying and 
telling the truth. 
Putting the matter in this way does not mean that an agent -­
a corporation executive, a university president, a locksmith -- who is 
confronted with a choice between lying and telling the truth may not 
face a real moral problem. But it is not the problem that it appears 
to be as long as we allow ourselves to talk the language of moral 
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principles. It is no longer the Pauline (or Freudian) problem of 
weakness of will, with role replacing interest as the rival to duty. 
It is not, that is to say, the problem of choosing between a universal 
principle ("preserve human life") and a role (surgeon). It is the 
problem of defining the role of surgeon with precision or, 
alternatively, of deciding whether a well-defined role needs 
redefinition � it is the problem, for instance, of determining 
whether the role of surgeon permits, or even requires, a performer in 
this role on occasion to take a human life (a senile patient in great 
pain? a fetus that is the outcome of a rape?). This way of putting 
the matter dissolves the problem of a possible conflict between a 
moral principle and a role into one or the other of the two problems I 
next deal with. 
(4) It might be thought, now that we have eliminated the 
possibility of a conflict between a moral principle and a role, that a 
moral agent has no problem at all if the role is well-defined and if 
he has fully internalized the role requirements. Then, it would seem, 
one knows what one ought do, i.e. , what behaviors are expected of one, 
and one has come to expect these behaviors of oneself. There are in 
all societies at all times powerful forces promoting internalization: 
public opinion communicated in sermons and editorials and by a 
thousand other means; regulations promulgated by various professional 
organizations -- bar associations, medical associations and the like; 
procedural rules formulated for an organization's employees by its 
management; the decisions of courts backed by legal sanctions. 
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When all these voices are unanimous -- and for certain ranges 
of behavior they practically are -- how is it possible for a moral 
agent to view his situation as problematic? Well, a scrupulous man 
may always ask himself whether the rule, however strongly reinforced, 
quite fits the facts of the present case. Though one can of course 
always take the easy way out by doing punctiliously no more and no 
less than what is expected, sometimes one may just possibly want to 
take a closer look. 
However, those who want to take a closer look will also want 
to avoid the possibility of finding themselves, like Milton's fallen 
angels, in wandering mazes lost. If formalism can be a vice, so, 
clearly, thinking too precisely on the event is a vice. The art of 
being moral -- and it is an art involves among other things the 
kind of sensitivity that can distinguish cases that deserve a closer 
look from those that do not; it is the art of being scrupulous, but 
also of being scrupulous about when to be scrupulous.9 
(5) This sort of moral problem the problem of deciding when 
to be scrupulous and how scrupulous to be � is different again from 
the problem that arises when one finds oneself in a situation which is 
not covered by any well-defined set of expectations. 
The behavioral alternatives one is considering � the options 
before one lie in a vagueness band, a band that results from the 
fact that, just at this point, society is not speaking unanimously but 
with several, perhaps many, different voices. This fifth kind of 
problem may occur at any time, for no role can ever be so exhaustively 
spelled out as to cover all possible cases. But in periods in which 
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roles are changing rapidly because the social context is fluid, this 
becomes the chief moral problem, and it is a cognitive problem: it is 
not the problem of bringing oneself to do what one knows one ought to 
do; it is the problem of coming to see what it is that one ought to 
do. 
Upper middle class American parents in the last decades of 
this century know much of what is expected of them, and what they 
expect ct themselves, as parents. Thus they are expected, and expect, 
to support their children through infancy and childhood, and up to the 
limits of financial capacity. But what is financial capacity, and how 
is it related to the quality of education and care that parents are 
expected, and expect, to furnish? In every social role there is a 
vagueness band between the kinds of conduct "everybody" agrees are 
expected ct actors in that role (for instance, upper middle class
parents are expected to support their children through high school) 
and the kinds of conduct that "everybody" agrees are not expected of 
actors in that role (parents are not expected to support adult 
children indefinitely in idleness). 
Further, of course, role expectations change over time, 
sometimes slowly, sometimes rapidly, and people differ a great deal in 
the speed and ease of their adjustment to these changes. This 
produces another vagueness band � a temporal vagueness band. At a 
given point in time everybody agrees that such-and-such behaviors are 
no longer (or not yet) expected of them. But with respect to still 
other behaviors there will be disagreement as to whether they are now 
expected. 
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When, for instance, did parents cease to believe that they 
were expected to protect teenage daughters from sexual adventures? 
But however rapidly this change occurred, there was for most parents a 
period of uneasiness regarding what society expected of them, and what 
they expected of themselves, with respect to this matter. And in some 
regions of the country and for some social classes this uneasiness 
persists, exacerbated by the fact that the parents' expectations 
regarding protection almost certainly differ from the expectations of 
their teenage daughters. In none of these vagueness bands does one 
receive decisive guidance, either in the form of a social consensus or 
in the form of a court ruling or other explicit regulation. Instead, 
many different voices speak, and one of these voices is one's own. 
Unfortunately for those who are made anxious by uncertainty, 
especially by moral uncertainty, these vagueness bands are often 
wide.10 
An individual in such a situation, whether he be anxious or 
not, wants to remove the present case from the vagueness band in which 
it now lodges. But he does not yet know in which direction to move 
it, inasmuch as in some respects it is like those cases to which it is 
agreed the role applied and yet in other respects like those cases to 
which it is agreed the role does not apply. He does not lack 
guidance; indeed, he may have more guidance than he knows what to do 
with. The guidance takes the form of calling his attention to 
similarities between this ambiguous case and clear-cut, obvious cases, 
but unfortunately since different guidance calls attention to 
different clear-cut cases, his problem is to decide which of the 
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similarities is most similar. For this he needs, above all good 
antennae, that is, an ability to distinguish between important and 
trivial differences. 
Differences that are important for one society will of course 
be trivial for another, but for the moment let us focus on the 
capacity to notice small differences -- differences which others, with 
less sensitive antennae, have overlooked but which, once noticed, they 
recognize to be important. Emma Woodhouse was one who had 
successfully internalized the role expectations for an early 
nineteenth century English gentlewoman; she perceived herself as -­
indeed, she was -- a lady. When she poked rather cruel fun at poor, 
defenseless Miss Bates, Mr. Knightley, whose antennae were much more 
sensitive than Emma's, pointed out to her the disparity between her 
chosen role and her behavior on this occasion: "I cannot see you 
acting wrong, without a remonstrance. How could you be so unfeeling 
to Miss Bates? How could you be so insolent in your wit to a woman of 
her character, age, and situation? � Emma, I had not thought it 
possible." Though Emma "tried to laugh it off, • she was most 
forcibly struck. The truth of his representation there was no 
denying. She felt it at her heart.1111 The result was a very
considerable modulation of Emma's perception of the role of a lady; 
and young lady readers of the novel might -- who knows? � incorporate 
this fictional modulation in their real-life behavior toward the 
real-life Miss Bates of their acquaintance. 
In any strongly segmented society a mark of good breeding -­
that is to say, of the qualities needed to rise -- has always been the 
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ability to differentiate minutely. Thus the Duchesse de Guermantes 
distinguished within the aristocracy, which to outsiders seemed an 
undifferentiated class, between the old and the new, between the pre-
revolutionary nobility and the parvenu, Napoleonic creations. She 
would never think of calling on the Princesse d'Iena, whose family, 
she remarked, was so absurdly "called after a bridge. " 
Marcel for his part had laboriously to learn modulations that 
were second nature to the Duchess. "The Duchesse de Guermantes, who 
had waved me so effusively a greeting with her gloved hand at the 
Opera-Comique, had appeared furious when I bowed to her in the 
street. " Yet - this is the present point Marcel did learn; he 
improved his antennae: when at a garden party he caught the Duke's 
eye, the latter being in conversation with the Prince of Wales, he did 
not approach as he would have done in less exalted circumstances; he 
won the Duke's approval by bowing from a distance and passing on.12 
Today such modulations as these, and the differentiations in 
the environment to which they were responsive will be viewed as 
trivial. I have chosen them precisely because they seem trivial 
reinforce the point that there is no fundamental difference between 
trivial modulations and important modulations -- no difference, that 
is, between the ways in which trivial and important modulations are 
introduced, no difference in the ways in which they become 
established, if indeed they become established; no difference in the 
ways in which they disappear, as all modulations, whether trivial or 
important, eventually do. 
to 
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How, then, does one distinguish between important and trivial 
modulations? The answer is that time will tell and that only time 
will tell; the test is the test of survival. A modulation may 
disappear as soon as it is introduced - the introducer himself may 
not like the look of it when he sees it in action, or he may retreat 
from the hostility of moral conservatives who hold, with the Harry 
Claverings of every generation in every society, that "No man has a 
right to be peculiar. Every man is bound to accept such usage as is 
customary in the world.1113 Other modulations take on -- because they
call people's attention to aspects of the situation that, now that 
they attend to them, seem to be relevant.14 These modulations become
a part of the culture and are now defended as correct usage by all the 
Harry Claverings who, earlier, had condemned them as deviations. 
Modulations obviously have more staying power when they are 
reinforced by the sanctions of courts and self-regulating bodies. But 
no such sanctions are likely to be introduced - still less to be 
sustained - unless they are based on already achieved, spontaneous 
consensuses. Thus the key element in moral change is always a 
decision by some morally sensitive individual - an individual who, 
having detected a failure of fit between an existing role expectation 
and the situation in which he now has to act, modulates the role 
d. 1 15accor ing y. The spread of a modulation through a society, prior to 
its codification in institutional and legal forms, is quite like the 
spread ot an esthetic innovation a new style in art or in music. 
If the modulation, whether moral or esthetic, takes on, we may be sure 
that it has brought into focus some aspect of people's experiential 
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field that is important to them and that was missed in the earlier, 
unmodulated formulation. 
Thus living morally -- that is, living well -- depends on 
learning to adjust roles to each other and role expectations to 
changing circumstances as we come to see their relevance or as they 
are shown to us by others. Here, if Aristotle did not say it all, as 
usual he said most of it: 
Any one can get angry that is easy -- or give or spend 
money; but to do this to the right person, to the right 
extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in 
the right way, that is not • • •  easy • • to determine 
by reasoning • • • ; such things depend on particular 
f d h d . . . h . 16 acts, an t e ecision rests wit perception. 
II 
Private Roles 
So much in general for the relation between role expectations 
and moral choice, which, I have emphasized, is intrinsically 
problematic. Save in an ant-like society of robots there will never 
be universal agreement about what, exactly, is expected of one in any 
particular, concrete situation; even baboons, one gathers, have to 
deal with, and resolve, moral choices. But today the moral life, 
already sufficiently problematic, is made more, and unnecessarily, 
problematic by a currently widespread tendency to conflate -- at least 
to slur over the difference between -- public and private roles. 
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People who act, and expect others to act, in public roles as if these 
were private roles and people who act, and expect others to act in 
private roles as if these were public roles, will never agree about 
what our duty is. 
This said, the next thing to be said is that, though there are 
indeed fundamental differences between public and private roles, 
especially if one thinks of ideal typical cases, actual roles fall 
into a spectrum ranging from those that are very private (e.g., 
friend, lover), to those that, though still private, take on some of 
the aspects of public roles (husband, wife, parent, child, teacher, 
pupil), to those that are fully public (president of a corporation, 
air controller, chief petty officer). The third thing to be said is 
that the locus of a role on this spectrum -- the point on the spectrum 
at which a role is perceived to be located when it is well performed 
varies with the varying perspectives of those making judgments 
about how roles ought to be played out. 
Let us list some of the features of obviously private roles --
that is, roles that "everybody" would locate towards the private end 
of the spectrum. (1) The more private a private role is the less it 
looks like a role; it is rather a relationship that is personal and so 
unique. Thus the paradigmatically private role is that of lover or 
friend, rather than husband or wife. Lovers and friends do indeed 
have expectations of each other -- expectations that may or may not be 
realized. However, the expectations of each pair of lovers, each pair 
of friends, are peculiar to this pair, not generalizable across pairs, 
even in the same social class and the same culture. Each pair has its 
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own flavor, its own tone, and its life is the living out of this 
flavor, this tone. This feature is especially marked in the kind of 
friendship Aristotle called the friendship of the good. Friendships 
of utility and of pleasure, in contrast, though each may develop its 
own flavor, are formed only because each party to the friendship knows 
what is expected of him and what he hopes to gain, and such 
friendships last only as long as these expectations are satisfied. 
As for marriage, it is true of course that each married pair 
has expectations that are unique to that pair; each marriage has its 
own flavor, good or bad. To that extent marriage is a private role 
sustained less by expectations satisfied than by the perceptions the 
married pair have of each other. But marriage is also an institution 
sanctioned by the state and maintained by a consensus that defines 
society's expectations for marriage. To that extent marriage is a 
public role. 
Romantic marriages are marriages based chiefly or even 
exclusively on an experienced flavor, and they endure only as long as 
the flavor lasts; when divorce is imminent we can see the private 
morality of such marriages turning into public morality. Commercial 
marriages are marriages of convenience. The morality of such 
marriages is public from the start, though they may, as time goes on, 
acquire a tone of their own and so move in the direction of private 
morality. 
People vary -- and cultures vary -- about where on this 
spectrum between romance and commerce they think a good marriage is 
likely to be located. Jane Austen thought that purely romantic 
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marriages were a disaster. Purely commercial marriages were hardly 
within her ken; we must go to Dickens or Thackerey or Trollope for an 
assessment of those -- Lizzie Greystock's marriage to Lord Eustace and 
Julia Brabazon's marriage to Lord Ongar were as disastrous, in 
Trollope's view, as any of the romantic elopements that offended Jane 
Austen's expectations for marriage. In this century -- indeed, in the 
last few decades � there has been a very massive shift of the 
perceived locus of a "good" marriage, a shift toward the romantic, or 
private, end of the spectrum. The current view has moved so far that, 
as a result of a kind of perspective foreshortening, the kinds of 
marriage that the nineteenth century held to be eminently sound are 
now lumped together with the kinds which that century condemned as 
merely commercial. 
(2) Roles are private not only to the extent that the 
expectations in which they consist are individuated to the persons 
concerned but also to the extent that these expectations are less that 
such-and-such behaviors be forthcoming in such-and-such circumstances 
than that the behaviors, whatever they be, are expressive of the 
. d . . h . h" 1 . h" 17 attitu es anl.lllating t e actors in t is re ations 1p. Alternatively,
we can say that a role is private to the extent that the behaviors in 
which the role consists are symbolic of the special flavor of this 
relationship, rather than recognized means to agreed-on ends. In 
private roles gestures -- facial expression, tone of voice, bodily 
movements -- are more important for what they reveal (or conceal) than 
for the results they achieve. 
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( 3) Roles are private to the extent that they are not clearly 
specified, ex ante expectations that the role players explicitly 
accept on entering the role. Rather, private roles grow and develop 
over time, within very loose and unspecified parameters. And they do 
not end briskly, with a bang, when one role player finds the other not 
living up to his expectations. They fade away as the relationship 
loses its flavor. This characteristically happens when the gestures 
come to be perceived as dishonest, as no longer revelatory of real 
feelings. 
(4) Private roles are organic patterns, whose end is this 
pattern itself, rather than aggregations of components combined into 
this role only because they subserve the external goal that this 
aggregation is expected to achieve. 
(5) Private roles are essentially limited to face-to-face, 
one-to-one relationships. A group (e.g., of friends) will consist of 
a set of more or less overlapping dyadic relationships. Such a group 
may even have a structure, but it will be a loose, fluid, horizontal 
structure that results from the fact that every individual in the 
group stands in a dyadic relationship to several group members. 
So much for the leading features of private roles. Private 
morality has an undeniably great appeal � an appeal so strong that 
many people treat all roles as private roles. That is, they view all 
social relations whatever as relations between private individuals: 
their expectations for the roles that I shall be characterizing as 
public are what they would be if these roles were truly private. 
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One of the most moving and certainly the best known � 
version of this view is contained in the sayings of Jesus as they are 
recorded in the New Testament. If we love God with all our hearts and 
our neighbor as ourselves we will never go wrong in particular 
concrete situations. Rules prescribing correct interpersonal 
expectations are therefore not only not needed; they are positively a 
hindrance to living morally. It has sometimes been argued that Jesus' 
specific injunctions -- turn the other cheek, judge not, love your 
enemies are examples of an "interim morality" -- they have been 
thought to reflect his belief that the end of the world was imminent. 
It is possible, however, that they reflect instead his sense that in 
private relationships the symbolic aspect of an action as revealing a 
state of mind is more important than its effect on the external state 
of affairs. Thus Jesus may have urged his followers to take no 
thought for the morrow, not because he believed they would have no 
time in which to calculate, but because he held calculation to be 
inappropriate in those human relationships that are based on love 
rather than on benefits to be received and given in return. 
Presumably Jesus would have allowed that some human relations must be 
based on a calculus of benefits -- he did say that we are to render 
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. But, save for this 
enigmatic remark, he ignored public morality; it was simply not worth 
thinking about. 
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason is another locus classicus 
for private morality; indeed, his aim may be said to have been to 
convert Jesus' version of private morality into a formal theory. 
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Unfortunately, private morality does not lend itself very readily to 
this kind of translation; in private morality it is the spirit that 
counts, not the architectonic. Thus Kant's absolutely universal, 
absolutely binding categorical imperatives are inappropriate in the 
domain of private morality. What matters to people engaged in living 
out some private role is that their partners' truth-telling or 
promise-keeping is an expression of a loving heart, not a possibly 
reluctant response to the stern voice of duty. 
Kant evinced about as little interest in public morality as 
Jesus did. It is true that his categorical imperatives do set up 
standard expectations that can be counted on if everyone always does 
his duty. They thus have one feature -- predictability -- that is 
important in the domain of public morality. But unfortunately these 
categorical imperatives are impractical. What public morality 
requires are those "hypothetical" imperatives which Kant rejected as 
having nothing whatsoever to do with morality. 
More illuminating of the essence of private morality than 
Kant's formal theory is an event in his old age. Very frail, almost 
senile, near to death, he tottered to his feet when his physician 
entered his room and refused to seat himself until the visitor had 
taken a chair. The physician protested; Kant replied, "The feeling 
for humanity has not yet left me.1118 Kant was not then acting in 
response to some categorical imperative. He was making a symbolic 
gesture that expressed the passion of a feeling heart. 
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III 
Public Roles 
What are features of roles that lead one to locate a role up 
toward the public end of the spectrum of roles, and how does this 
affect one's view of what it is to play that role well, i.e., morally? 
(1) Just as the more private a private role is the less it looks like 
a role, so the more public a public role is, the more it looks like 
in fact, is -- a role. The more, that is, it is a set of standard 
expectations fixed in advance for the role players, rather than 
created by them in the process of acting out the role. Thus the 
paradigmatically public role is a Weberian slot in some large 
bureaucracy, defined in such a way that everybody who meets a certain 
level of competence can perform equally well in the role. Ideally, 
role players in public roles come and go unnoticed; arrivals and 
departures do not affect the execution of the role. This contrasts 
with private roles, where the individual performer not only makes a 
difference, but makes the whole difference. A friendship of the good 
disintegrates with the disappearance of one friend, and even in the 
most commercial of marriages the departure of an old husband (or wife) 
and the arrival of a new one is usually noticed. 
Of course, the ideal of the totally replaceable performer is 
never realized. In even the most routinized of roles -- e.g. , 
execution of an assembly-line task or of the manual of arms -­
performances vary a bit from individual performer to individual 
performer, as foremen and drill sergeants know to their sorrow. 
Further, the higher a slot is in any hierarchy of bureaucratically 
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defined slots, the more that role, whilst remaining a public role, 
takes on some of the features of a private role. At the highest 
levels -- president, prime minister, general officer commanding 
individual style makes a great difference. Think of Hoover and 
Roosevelt, Chamberlain and Churchill, MacArthur and Marshall. 
But however individualized the performance of a public role 
may be, the expectations for public roles are always spelled out for 
the performer in advance by a constitution or by some other document, 
and the ultimate measure of role playing is not style but how well the 
role player manages to fulfill those expectations. What one chiefly 
admires in the playing out of a role that one takes to be private is 
grace; what one chiefly admires in the playing out of a role that one 
takes to be public is effectiveness. 
(2) Public roles are less free than private roles in the sense 
that the performer of a public role has an obligation to the 
organization of which that role is a part to do the best for that 
organization that he can. Not that performers of private roles do not 
experience conflicts between the different private claims of husband, 
wife, child, parent. But in addition to such conflicts as these, 
performers of public roles experience, and have to resolve, conflicts 
between private claims as such and the public clal.Ill of their public 
role, whatever it is. 
And not only is there an almost inevitable conflict between 
public claims as such and private claims as such; there will be 
conflicts stemming from the fact that organizations are often nested, 
a smaller inside of a larger, and that larger one inside of a still 
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larger. If the interests of the nested organizations are not 
identical -- and they seldom are -- the performer of a public role in 
anyone of these nested organizations in some sense has a role in all 
the others, to all of which he owes a prima facie duty. Consider a 
U.S. Senator weighing his differential prima facie duties to his 
state, to the Senate itself, to the nation, and to the UN, not to 
mention his prima facie duty to his family. This greatly complicates 
life for performers of public roles, and is sometimes felt as a heavy 
burden, so heavy that many people seek to avoid it, either by opting 
out of public roles so far as possible or else by treating their 
public roles as if they did not differ in any way from private ones. 
(3) Public roles are impersonal in a sense that is well 
represented by the way two bureaucrats may negotiate by an exchange of 
correspondence, a procedure that reduces the chance that 
idiosyncracies of style or of personality traits might affect the 
outcome in unpredictable ways, i.e., ways that defeat the expectations 
for the roles. Impersonality characterizes performance not only at 
lower level in an organizational hierarchy, but at least to some 
extent at the highest levels of public roles, where, as we have seen, 
some idiosyncratic role playing is expected, A president negotiating 
with a prime minister certainly takes account of the individual 
persol)ality traits of the other, but he does so to gain a tactical 
advantage, not because he loves his opposite number. 
Thus we judge the interactions of people we think of as 
performing public roles by very different standards from those we 
apply to the interactions of people we think of as performing private 
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roles, condemning in the one precisely those modes of negotiation 
which we approve in the other. And note that the standards are so 
different for the two kinds of roles that we resist using the term 
"negotiation" to describe approved modes of interaction between 
husbands and wives, friends and lovers, inasmuch as this term suggests 
an arms-length calculating stance which is inappropriate for 
performers in private roles. 
(4) Public roles are impersonal in still another way. The 
ideal-typical performer of a public role allocates rewards and 
punishments, promotions and demotions, in strict accordance with 
criteria that are applicable across the board, uninfluenced by his 
personal feelings, whether favorable or hostile, toward the persons 
concerned. This way of behaving is inappropriate in private roles and 
is rightly condemned there. In private roles it is right that love, 
concern, pity, as much as merit and demerit determine how rewards are 
distributed, and often right, too, that deserved penalties be 
foregone. Conduct that would be called "favoritism" or "nepotism" 
pejorative terms these -- in public roles is morally right in private 
roles. 
( 5 )  Public roles are planned; private roles grow. Further, 
public roles are designed with a view to the maintenance and 
improvement of the organization in which these roles are intended to 
function. Performance in a public role is therefore judged by the 
extent to which that performance contributes to the goals of the 
organization in question. The motives and attitudes of a performer of 
a public role are therefore largely irrelevant, except so far as they 
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affect his ability to perform well in the role. 
At the lower levels in any organization janitor, aircraft 
maintenance man, assembly line worker � roles are defined in great 
detail. What is expected.of performers in such roles -- what they 
ought to do � is to carry out the prescribed behaviors punctiliously: 
theirs not to reason why, theirs to get on with the job. At the upper 
levels of an organization -- corporation president, chief of staff � 
where only the goals are defined (and then only in very broad terms) 
and the means are left largely open, what is expected of the performer 
is sound decision, i.e., correct cost/benefit calculation. Does one, 
or doesn't one, manage to get there fustest with the mostest? 
This is the basis for appeals to raison d'etat, a phrase that' 
has a bad name, not only because it is French but because unscrupulous 
rulers have so often used it to justify purely selfish conduct. But 
misuse should not discredit a practice that all office holders have 
always adopted. Lord Grey, the Whig prime minister who steered the 
Reform Bill successfully through Parliament, was only being more frank 
than most politician� when he remarked, "No one admires the grand 
principles of morality more than I do, but great nations cannot be 
guided by these rules." Grey could just as well have been speaking of 
the managers of any large organizations; there is nothing especially 
distinctive about great states. What he meant by "the grand 
principles of morality" was presumably something like the Kantian 
categorical imperatives. He was saying that these imperatives apply 
-- if indeed they ever apply� only in the domain of private morals. 
A prime minister, he was saying, cannot afford the luxury of never 
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telling a lie, never breaking a promise. He has to do the best he 
knows how to do for his country. 
Everybody -- everybody, that is, except Kantians and other 
moral purists � agrees that something like the raison d'etat 
principle operates in the domain in public morality. Everybody 
except the most cynical of Machiavellians � agrees that the raison 
d'etat principle does not exempt performers of public roles from any 
and all consideration of the kinds of prima facie duties that 
predominate in the domain of private morality. Everybody agrees that 
behavior that would be acceptable in public roles is unacceptable if 
it occurs in private roles; we call it "heartless" when it occurs. 
Everybody agrees that behavior that would be acceptable in private 
roles is inappropriate in public roles; we call it "sentimental." But 
when we get down to specific cases, nonterminating disagreements are 
likely to develop. Was McNamara ruthless in ordering area bombing in 
Vietnam and the wholesale uprooting of villagers? or was he performing 
a distasteful job as well as he knew how? Was Carter sentimental in 
risking a general war for the sake of the 52 hostages? or was he a 
noble humanitarian? 
In some cases the distinction between public and private roles 
is clear-cut. Everyone agrees that there is a distinction between 
Eisenhower as president and Eisenhower as husband. Even those who 
think that he should not have lied to Khrushchev about the U-2 
overflights will surely allow that this lie was on a different footing 
from any lie he may have told Mamie, supposing he had anything to lie 
about, regarding his relation with Kay Summersby. To hold that the 
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President of the U.S. should not lie t o  the first secretary o f  the 
Communist Party USSR is to treat a public role as if it were a private 
one. One can say � and rightly say -- that Eisenhower should not 
have allowed himself to be maneuvered into the position where he had 
to make this choice. But the only relevant question about his lie to 
Khrushchev was whether, in the awkward circumstances in which he found 
himself, a lie exposed would damage the U.S. more than the truth 
admitted. What is called for is a calculation of comparative costs. 
But calculations about the chances of exposure, were he to lie to Mrs. 
Eisenhower, would have been inappropriate, and the lie, had he indeed 
lied, would have been wrong even if he hoped thereby to spare her 
pain. For, though one certainly wants a friend or lover to be 
faithful, one would rather know him to be unfaithful, if he is, and 
forgive him if one can, than be party to a fraudulent relationship. 
But most actions do not fall so neatly into either the public 
or the private domain. What, for instance, about (possible) lies to 
Macmillan, instead of to Khrushchev? to John Foster DullP.s instead ci 
to Mrs. Eisenhower? In such cases the behaviors have both public a;­
private features, and different people, attending to different aspect.-: 
of the performance, will reach different conclusions about whether 
Eisenhower ought not to have lied. Some will recall that Eisenhower 
and Macmillan were long-time friends; others will regard this 
relationship as irrelevant in view of the fact that Macmillan was now 
prime minister. 
That is to say, some people assimilate the Macmillan and the 
Dulles cases perhaps even the Khrushchev case � to the Mamie case. 
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Others assimilate the Dulles and Macmillan cases � and possibly even 
the Mamie case -- to the Khrushchev case. These differences 
correspond to the shift in perspective (already noted) ,  as a result of 
which marriages that Jane Austen and Trollope praised as "sound" are 
nowadays assimilated to marriages that they and we alike deplore. 
Why do such perspectival differences occur? The answer seems 
to be that people differ temperamentally "attitudinally" might be a 
better word � and that these difference in temperament or attitude 
affect the way they look at social roles and so their moral assessment 
of performance in these roles. 
Some people, that is to say, feel comfortable only in 
relatively well-defined relationships with others (they like to "know 
where they stand" ) .  Loose and fluid relationships not only seem to 
them to be wasteful and inefficient; such relationships generate a 
considerable amount of cognitive dissonance. Such people prefer to 
maintain a distance psychic and even physical � from the people 
with whom they interact -- actio ad distans is their motto. Further, 
they like to organize problems systematically, dividing them into 
their components and dealing with each of these in turn. Other 
people, in contrast, feel comfortable only in informal relationships. 
Situations that the first group find congenial, are felt by these 
people to be stiff, empty, and "unnatural." So far from preferring to 
tackle a problematic situation from outside, these people want to know 
how it looks to those with whom they are interacting. Empathy, not 
observation, seems to them the route to successful problem solving, 
and calculation puts them "out of tune and harsh. " 
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Clearly, the first sort of temperament will perform best in 
public roles; the second, in private roles. And when people with the 
first sort of temperament find themselves in private roles they are 
likely to perform in these roles as if they were public for 
instance, they may adopt an arms-length attitude toward a spouse or a 
child, treating him/her almost as they would business rivals. And the 
second group, who perform best in private roles are likely to make the 
same sort of mistake, but in the opposite direction, assuming that 
they can have the same sort of easy relationship with their employees 
that they have with an old college chum. 
The conditions of modern life, playing on these differences in 
temperament and exaggerating them, have resulted in strongly 
bipolarized expectations for many roles. Some people seem to respond 
to large-scale organizations, urbanization, and anomie by 
externalizing more and more roles. Thus the role of physician, which 
was once largely private (the Victorian physician who helped his dying 
patient across the threshold and supported the survivors in their 
grief is no fiction) ,  has now become largely depersonalized, more 
public than many public roles. Meanwhile, in contrasting reaction to 
these same features of twentieth century culture, other people 
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personalize roles that were formerly regarded as public : corporation 
executives go to great pains to be liked by their employees, parents 
want to be friends with their children, and deans never think of 
imposing fines on student offenders. 
When role expectations are strongly bipolarized, some people 
will view a particular role as public and so apply public criteria te 
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the evaluation of performance in that role, while others , viewing that 
same role as private, apply private criteria to it. Thus 
nonterminating disagreements regarding the morality of many actions 
are inevitably generated. Hence , though one hopes that an analysis 
like this, by emphasizing the ways in which the criteria for public 
and private roles differ , will reduce moral disagreements , it would be 
naive to expect to eliminate them altogether. For people may agree 
that different criteria are appropriate for public and private roles , 
', 
and even agree about what these different criteria are, and yet still 
differ about the locus of a particular role on the spectrum of roles 
that I described at the outset. 
IV 
The Divestiture Controversy 
Should trustees of colleges and universities divest themselves 
of stock in companies doing business in South Africa? or only of stock 
in companies with South African subsidiaries? or only of stock in 
companies doing business with the South African govermnent? or only of 
stock in companies supplying military equipment to that govermnent 
which it might use against Black liberation movements? Or should 
trustees ignore all such considerations and concentrate on investing 
in such a way as to maximize return on the portfolio, in accordance 
with the prudent man rule? 
Opinions range over the whole spectrum of possibilities, but 
while some trustees advocate a policy of divestment and some students 
and faculty members advocate a policy of return maximization, the 
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central tendency of trustee opinion and the central tendency of 
student-faculty opinion are strongly bipolarized.19 An immense amount 
of talk has been generated, but it has produced more heat than light, 
for much of the talk on both sides is less an attempt to decide what 
is right than to defend an entrenched position and to browbeat 
opponents into going along. 
I hope that the concepts discussed in the first three sections 
of this paper will encourage a more rational, and less rhetorical, 
approach to this question, and I shall begin by considering the 
divestiture case in the context of our discussions (in Section I ) of 
the varied kinds of circumstances in which moral problems arise. 
(1) It is possible that some trustees here and there encounter the
divestiture question as the problem of deciding which of two prima 
facie duties is the weightier. For instance, a trustee might have 
promised a fellow trustee or the president of his institution that he 
would vote one way on this issue and then come to believe that the 
course of action he has agreed to is wrong � he is in the same 
position as the member of a tenure review committee who feels a 
personal oDligation to an unsuitable candidate. But such cases are 
probably rare: for the typical trustee the divestiture question does 
not arise in this kind of context. 
(2) It is possible that the divestiture question may appear to 
some trustees as a conflict between duty and interest. A trustee 
might, for instance , have a large personal interest in a company doing 
business in South Africa and also believe that the college ought to 
sell its stock in the company. Alternatively , a trustee might so 
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loath the racial policies of the South African govermnent that he is 
eager to divest, and yet believe that divestment is incompatible with 
a prudent investment policy. But cases of this kind are probably 
exceptional; the divestiture question does not typically arise in this 
context. 
(3) Some trustees may feel that the divestiture question is a 
conflict between their role as trustee and some moral principle � for 
instance, the principle that aid and comfort should never be extended 
to iniquitous govermnents anywhere in the world. Since, I have said, 
I believe this way of describing the problem trustees face is best 
described in terms of case ( 4) or case (5), I will move on to these 
cases. 
(4) Until quite recently it was possible for trustees to 
believe that the role of trustees regarding management of college 
endowments is well defined. There was general agreement that trustees 
are expected to maximize income within the limits of the prudent man 
rule. If they did that, they had done all that was expected of them 
and all that they expected of themselves; it was not only permissible, 
it was right, to ignore all other considerations as irrelevant. 
Though an occasional trustee may have asked himself whether all other 
considerations really are irrelevant, most trustees would have 
regarded such trustees as over scrupulous. 
All that has now changed. Given the amount of talk that the 
divestiture question has generated, it does not take very sensitive 
antennae for trustees to conclude that they need to take another look. 
What once seemed obvious -- that the prudent man rule was an adequate 
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guide -- now seems doubtful. Because society a t  large n o  longer 
speaks with a unanimous voice regarding its expectations for the ways 
trustees handle the investments for which they are responsible, 
investment policy has slipped into a vagueness band. 
(5) It would seem, then, that for the typical trustee the 
divestiture question is like the problem middle-class parents face 
regarding how far to go in trying to protect their teenage daughters 
from sexual adventures and all the other moral problems that arise in 
periods of rapid cultural change. Trustees, like parents of �eenage 
daughters, do not lack guidance; they have more guidance than they 
know what to do with. For trustees the guidance comes in the form of 
proposed modulations of their investment policy. The modulations are 
all designed to take account of (that is, adjust investment policy to) 
features of the social environment that their critics feel trustees 
have overlooked. But "overlooked" is not the right word: To the 
critics these features are so obvious and so important that to them 
trustees seem deliberately obtuse. To trustees, however, these 
features are either less important or else counterbalanced by features 
of the enviromnent that their critics in their turn have overlooked or 
minimized. 
How can such differences in perception occur? I believe they 
are due in part to the kinds of temperamental, or at titudinal, 
differences described at the end of Section III. Today's students are 
in many respects the inheritors of the sixties. Though hippy-dropout, 
Vietnam protests, sit-ins, flower children, zen, and many of other 
phenomena of that time may have largely have disappeared, much of the 
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mentality that was common to them has survived � for instance, a 
hostility to large organizations. Inasmuch as roles in large 
organizations are prototypical of public roles, hostility to large 
organizations has easily been transferred to public roles of all 
kinds. 
Young people, then, are likely to be found among those whose 
temperament leads them to assimilate public roles to private ones. 
Since they do not discriminate between public and private roles, they 
expect people to perform in all roles as if these roles were private. 
When these expectations are disappointed because the performers 
distinguish, as their critics do not, between public and private roles 
these performers are perceived as having done what they ought not 
to have done and to have left undone what they ought to have done. 
They are morally condemned for performances which, from their own 
point of view, are morally praiseworthy because these performances 
conform to their own expectations for the role. 
In contrast, trustees, both by reason of temperament and of 
experience, may be inclined to assimilate all roles to public roles. 
Many, perhaps most, trustees are corporation executives and directors; 
those who are lawyers are typically members of large firms -- men and 
women of affairs. They may, therefore, perceive their role as 
trustees of educational institutions on the model of the institutions 
they know best. For instance, it is certainly the job of trustees to 
maximize income from investments, but it is their job to do so within 
limitations that are not applicable to purely prof it-making 
institutions. Trustees who assimilate their role in academic 
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institutions t o  their role as directors o f  corporations are likely t o
go a s  far wrong in the opposite direction -- as are students who 
assimilate the role of trustee to that of a private person who can 
invest just as he chooses. Thus, the difficult problem for trustees 
of deciding what changes, if any, to make in their investment policy 
is exacerbated by perspectival differences between their role 
expectations for themselves and students' role expectations for them. 
In the remainder of this paper I shall examine some of the 
typical modulations in investment policy that have been proposed, with 
a view to showing why trustees and students look at these proposals so 
differently. I do not expect this discussion to resolve the issue. I 
only hope to clarify a bit for the disputants what it is that they are 
disputing about. By defining the issue more narrowly it may be 
possible to replace muddled disagreement, which always raises 
temperatures, with focused disagreement, which , sometimes at least, 
lowers them. 
But first, before turning to the propo sed modulations, it may 
be helpful to make a general observation about reactions to vagueness 
bands. As I pointed out earlier, people respond differentially, with 
greater or less anxiety, when the choice they hs�e to make lies within
a region in which their role is not well defined . This is doubtless a 
matter of individual difference, but, generally spe�king , vagueness 
bands are more productive of anxiety for trustees than 4r� the 
vagueness bands that exist in many public roles. In the first place, 
trustees tend to be cautious people -- they would not be chosen as 
trustees if they were not thought to be cautious. In the second 
40 
place, people who might not be particularly cautious in running their 
own businesses or managing their own affairs are likely to be cautious 
when they perform as trustees. They have nothing to gain personally, 
and much to lose, if some acts of theirs whose moral character is at 
present undefined, are subsequently defined, by law or by public 
opinion, as impermissible for trustees, instead of as a part of their 
whole duty as trustees. This tendency toward caution is reinforced by 
the fact that many trustees are lawyers and by trustees' uneasy 
awareness that we are living in a litigious age. 
It is natural, then, for trustees to resist efforts on 
anybody's part -- whether students or faculty members or, for that 
matter, fellow trustees -- to dislodge them from areas where 
expectations are well established and into areas where expectations 
are mixed. This is precisely one of the features of trustee 
performance for which students are likely to feel contempt. Since 
private roles are not tied to institutional goals and performance in 
them is therefore not judged by the extent to which it furthers these 
goals, private roles are irresponsible -- carefree save for the role 
player's personal responsibilities toward his opposite number in the 
dyadic relation. To the extent that students, failing to understand 
or willfully ignoring the difference between public and private roles, 
assimilate the former to the latter, behavior that appears to trustees 
to show a proper sense of responsibility is viewed by students as at 
best stuffy conservatism, at worse sheer cowardice. 
(1) What I have been saying about trustee dislike of vagueness 
bands and preference for well defined expectations, applies of course 
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generally. But its relevance to the divestiture controversy is plain. 
As long as trustees do not change their investment policy, they have 
not entered the vagueness band � they may be hovering on the edge, 
but they are not yet in it. But as soon as they adopt any one of the 
divestiture proposals, even the most modest, they will have moved into 
a zone of uncertainty regarding expectations for the management of 
institutional investments. They cannot know what they will find in 
Pandora's box nor whether, when they have opened it, they can get it 
closed again. 
Once trustees have been nudged, or dragged reluctantly, into 
the vagueness band, they have to decide where in that band to draw the 
line between the kinds of investments they feel justified in making 
and those they reject as unacceptable. Everybody -- except the most 
left-wing of students agrees that investment in the so-called 
American free enterprise system is appropriate. Everybody agrees that 
investment in bordellos or in operations like the Mafia are 
inappropriate, no matter how large the total return may be. Most 
people agree that it would be appropriate ( if it were also prudent) to 
invest in the UK, even though race riots occur there. Many people 
agree that it is appropriate to invest in Chile and Argentina, even 
though many Americans dislike the record of those countries on civil 
liberties. 
On which side of the line distinguishing permissible from 
impermissible investments does the UK fall? Is it more like South 
Africa or more like the Mafia? Without clear guidelines from courts 
or from public opinion, these are not easy questions to answer. This 
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explains the attraction to many trustees of the Sullivan formula.20
It appeals to trustees less perhaps because they view it as 
"reasonable" than because, if it takes on, investment decisions 
regarding companies doing business in South Africa will become 
routinized ; they will have been removed from the vague band. 
(2) Other modulations concern, not what stocks, to sell, bµt 
how to dispose of those that are to be sold. Heretofore, when the 
investment committee of a board decided, for whatever reason, to 
eliminate some holding from its portfolio, it simply instructed its 
brokers to sell, and was the end of it. That will not be the end of 
it if student opinion has its way. Student opinion not only wants the 
sales to be made ; it wants them made with fanfares and trumpets. It 
wants maximum publicity for the sales because it wants to use them to 
influence policy -- the policy of U.S. corporations and of the U.S. 
government and, ultimately, the policy of the South African 
government. 
It would miss the students' point to argue that the holdings 
of American educational institutions are too small for sales to have 
an effect. Student opinion is proposing that education institutions 
as represented by their boards of trustees become lobbies � whether 
successful or unsuccessful lobbies is beside the point. This would 
be, from trustees' points of view, a very large modulation of their 
role expectations. It is not the case of course that boards of 
trustees never lobby. On the contrary, boards are expected to lobby 
on matters directly affecting their institutions. Boards that did not 
lobby against legislation that would abolish the deduction for 
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charitable giving would be accused � and rightly accused � of 
neglecting their duty. But the proposed modulation calls for an 
institution's trustees to lobby in a matter that certainly does not 
affect that institution directly, and does not even affect it 
indirectly, except in the way and to the extent that it affects all 
people everywhere. 
Trustees, as we have seen, like to have lines drawn that will 
provide guidance for them and so diminish their responsibility. They 
are bound to ask where, if they lobby against South African racial 
policy, they are to draw the line that defines permissible lobbying 
from impermissible, or imprudent, lobbying. If they have a duty to 
lobby against South Africa have they also a duty to lobby against 
Chile and Argentina? The wider the domain in which lobbying is 
expected of trustees (i.e., is regarded as a duty), the more likely 
they are to expose their institution to retaliation from those who 
favor the policies that the trustees have lobbied against. 
(3) Trustees are likely to want to calculate the cost s  and 
benefits to their institution of this and other proposed modub t io1::J: 
of their role, and in making these calculations they are l ikely t o
take seriously the risk to their institution at tendant on their 
descending from the ivory tower and tiptoeing into the political 
arena. Trustees take this risk seriously because, once again, they 
are responsible if something goes wrong; it is they who will be 
blamed. Students, who are not responsible if something goes wrong, 
are likely to weigh the risk as low, if they weigh it at all. But the 
chief issue between trustees and students is not a difference in the 
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outcome of two calculations ; it is a difference of opinion as to 
whether calculation is appropriate in this kind of situation. 
In the view of trustees it is their duty to calculate as best 
they can, about all matters that come before them for decision: That, 
to them, is what doing the best they can for their institution means. 
From their point of view , the proposal to expand their role as trustee 
to include lobbying against corporations doing business in South 
Africa merely introduces a new and difficult-to-measure item into 
their calculations. Since trustees are on the whole risk-averse and 
since they can have little confidence in the results of this 
calculation, they are likely to resist the proposed modulation. 
To students this manner of approaching the issue is 
fundamentally wrong-headed. To them calculation with respect to a 
moral issue is unseemingly. Because they can, and do, take a high 
moral stand in their own private roles they see no reason why trustees 
should not take a high moral stand in their public role. That is to 
say, once again they assimilate public roles to private roles. 
( 4) Another sign of this assimilation is the students' 
preference for the term "divest" to describe what they want 
educational institutions to do. "Sell" is an ordinary , everyday, 
run-of-the-mill word ; "divest" is a very high class word , with 
connotations of cleansing, purifying, and laying bare. Divest ! 
divest ! has much the tonal quality of repent ! repent ! In both cases 
the kingdom of heaven is just around the corner, its coming only 
delayed by the intransigence of a handful of stubborn sinners. 
45 
Though students certainly hope that an educational lobby will 
have a salutary effect on corporations, they also believe that 
publicized sale of the corporations' stock will have a salutary effect 
on the sellers ; it will be like public confession, good for the 
institutional soul. In a word, disposing of the stock is prized by 
them as a symbolic gesture , as well as a likely cause of a change in 
the behavior of corporation. And symbolism, as we have seen, is a 
characteristic feature of behavior in the private domain, not the 
bl . d . 21 pu i.c omai.n. It is as if the students are trying to speak across 
the public domain -- that is, across the many political, economic and 
social institutions that separate them -- directly to the Blacks in 
South Africa. 
Symbolic gestures lose some of their value as symbols if the 
gesturer gains by making them; a gesture is especially valuable when 
one loses by making it. Then and only then can those to whom it is 
made be sure that the gesturer's heart is pure. Hence students are 
untouched by the argument sometimes put forward , that selling the 
stock would cause a decline in the return on the portfolio. Trustees 
would regard a decline as a serious matter if they really believed 
that losses would be likely. But students � the portfolio to 
suffer -- not too much , of course , and doubtless not in ways that 
would affect them personally ! No wonder, then, that a meeting of 
minds is difficult. 
Given such differences in perspective as these it is not 
surprising that students and trustees fail to understand each othe:: . 
If we were all as rational as the Cartesian cogito we would , all of 
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us, trustees and students alike, draw a firm distinction between the 
things a member of an organization may do -- indeed, in certain 
circumstances, ought to do � as an individual and the things he may 
do � indeed, in certain circumstances ought to do as a 
representative of the organization. A trustee who is convinced of the 
iniquity of the South African government could, as a private 
individual (for he is a private individual as well as a trustee),  take 
the same high line that students take in theirs. It would be right 
for the trustee, if he chose, to sell the stock in his own portfolio 
of any companies doing busines s  in South Africa, and to sell it 
without calculating costs, if he chose, s imply because he loathed the 
policy of the South African government. And that would be quite 
consistent with his believing that, in his role as trustee, he ought 
to calculate and then deciding to vote against selling the same stock 
in the institution' s  portfolio, because the result of the calculation 
indicated that the likely costs to the institution exceeded likely 
benefits to Blacks in South Africa. 
And so too for the matter of lobbying. In this country every 
citizen has a right to expres s  his views on foreign policy to his 
government and to try to change that policy to conform to his view of 
what it should be. And no one would deny that citizens have a right 
to combine in order to this more effectively. An individual who 
happens to be a trustee does not lose this right because he is a 
trustee, but he doesn't necessarily have this right as trustee. Any 
trustee who chooses to do so can join forces with like-minded students 
to lobby for a change in U. S. policy towards South Africa. Indeed, 
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there could be a lobby in which all the trustees, and only the 
trustees, of some institution were members. Though the membership of 
such a lobby would be identical with the membership of the board, the 
lobby would not be speaking for the institution; each member of the 
lobby would be speaking as an individual not as a trustee. 
It would be difficult, of course, to prevent a lobby so 
constituted from being identified with the board of that institution : 
what is a firm distinction for the Cartesian cogito is eroded in the 
comings and goings of everyday life, and even the trustees themselves 
might forget whether they had assembled as trustees or as private 
lobbyists. But the distinction is worth noting, for the test ought to 
be how likely it is that the individual lobbyists will be perceived 
and slip into perceiving themselves � as representatives of the 
organization with which they are connected. 
Generally speaking, the higher a slot is in an organizational 
hierarchy, the more difficult it is to make a firm distinction between 
the public and private roles of any individual occupying that slot. 
This is why it would be difficult for a group of trustees to lobby as 
individuals. But student slots are much lower in the institutional 
hierarchy, and the occupiers of these slots are four-year transients. 
It ought to be pos sible therefore for the students at some institution 
to organize a lobby which would not be taken to represent that 
institution, and it would be pos sible if the students did not act as 
if they were representing the institution. That they do so is again 
partly a result of their assimilation of public roles to private roles 
-- they ignore the relation, fundamental to public roles and wholly 
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absent in private roles, between representation and responsibility. 
Though this is perhaps true of most students, some positively want to 
be taken as representing the institution, since this, as they think, 
gives their lobby more leverage. It can thus happen that a group of 
student activists, a small minority of the student body, take over 
some all-student organization and then presume to speak not only for 
this organization but for the institution itself. 
What the trustees of such institutions face is a very profound 
proposed modulation of their role as trustees, which has nothing to 
do, specifically, with their role as investors in companies doing 
business in South Africa. What is being proposed -- it isn't at all 
clear how many of the proposers are fully aware of what they are 
proposing � is a change in the role of trustees from being in some 
sense the "owners" of the institution the ultimate source, that is, 
of authority � to being the servants of a large and vaguely defined 
constituency, students, faculty, alumni, the public � all those who 
have an interest in the institution. Trustees would no longer 
represent the institution, which, as long as they are its owners, 
means in effect representing their collective view of the best 
interest of the institution. Instead, they would reflect the will of 
this indefinitely large constituency � its view of the interest of 
the institution -- so far as they can ascertain what that view is. 
Tne problem of trustees would thus be transformed into the problem of 
legislators everywhere, the problem of whether to represent their 
constituents' interests or to reflect their constituents' wishes . 
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Of all the modulations I have discussed this is by far the 
largest, but since it is as yet only a small cloud on the horizon, I 
shall return in conclusion to the more immediate and by no means 
trivial problem of investment in companies doing business in South 
Africa. It is easy, in this connection, to remind trustees and 
students that what a trustee does as an individual is one thing and 
what he does as a trustee is another, and such a reminder may possibly 
reduce the area of disagreement. Unfortunately, to tell trustees that 
the criteria appropriate in private roles are quite different from 
those appropriate in public roles does not go very far in helping them 
decide how to vote on the divestiture question. The divestiture 
question is not unique; it differs in no way from the problematic of 
moral choice everywhere. The students are proposing a change in 
investment policy to the trustees because they see something in the 
trustees' enviromnent that the trustees themselves may not have 
noticed, but which the students view as important. This is always the 
function of a proposed modulation : to bring into focus something in 
the environment that is relevant to role performance but that has not 
yet been taken into account by performers in that role. 
One specific function of student indignation at Afrikaans 
treatment of Blacks is to make trustees, who are perhaps hardened, by 
reason of age and experience, to injustice everywhere, aware of how 
iniquitous Afrikaans policy is. Another function is to remind 
trustees that educational institutions differ in important ways from 
banks and business corporations. 
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It is one thing, of course, to be brought to attend to 
features of one's environment one may have overlooked; it is another 
thing to know how to weigh them. Trustees will not fail to note that 
the change in their environment to which their attention is being 
called is not a change in the policy of the South African government 
but a fairly recent change in students' attitudes toward a long-time 
South African policy. This being the case, trustees will wonder 
whether the intensity of student indignation at injustice in South 
Africa reflects only the passions of youth. At the same time they are 
bound to ask themselves whether their own perhaps cooler reaction 
reflects the rigidities of age .  They would like to know whether the 
changes in their environment that are being brought to their attention 
are the wave of the future or only an ephemeral ripple. They do not 
want to be a King Canute resisting a wave; they do not want to be 
stampeded by a ripple . 
It is hard to be a trustee . But then it is hard to be a moral 
agent . If one could either look into the future or else wait for the 
long run, one could always be assured of doing the right thing. But 
one cannot look into the future, and in the long run even trustees are 
dead . Like all moral agents everywhere, trustees will have to make up 
their own minds, trying to be sensitive -- but not too sensitive � to 
whatever other moral agents bring to their attention, and knowing that 
the best anyone can do at any time is to do the best that one can do 
at that time. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This is the theme of James Gould Cozzens' By Love Possessed.
2. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII, Part I I .
3 .  Ibid . 
4. Book III, 11, 87 0-90.
5. I owe this example to John F. Benton's as yet unpublished paper, 
"Written Records and the Development of Systematic Feudal
Relations, " pp . 6-7. It is interesting to note that Duke William
apparently agreed with Roger's assessment of the relative
importance of his two roles . Though William at first banished
Roger from Normandy, he called Roger's treatment of Ralph 
"handsome and proper, " and restored Roger's honors . 
6 .  I owe this terminology t o  W.  D .  Ross (in The Right and the Good) . 
Ross of course would have rejected with horror the notion, put 
forward here, that prima f acie duties are generated by 
expectations . 
7. Romans, 7: 8-20, 24.
8. See above, pp . 6-7.
9. There is a close relationship between this matter of trying to be 
scrupulous without being overscrupulous and the concept of 
5 2  
10 . 
"satisficing." See for instance recent papers (SSWP 363  and 381) 
by Louis Wilde and Alan Schwartz. I am not sure, however , 
whether these economic models are relevant to the individual 
decider dealing with the real-life problems he faces in his 
public and private roles. This may be one of the marks that 
distinguishes ethic from economics. It would seem that whatever 
is scientific about what used to be called "moral science" has 
been absorbed into economics , leaving the unscientific remainder 
to the care of philosophy. 
What are called (collectively and loosely) the media are powerful 
forces , muting these divergent voices and flattening out 
expectations to a dull least common denominator. The soaps , the 
Mary Worths , the Dear Abbys encourage an oversimplified 
uniformity of response by ignoring everything that makes each 
case at least a bit different from every other. This certainly 
has the advantage of reducing , or altogether eliminating, the 
anxiety of the anxious, but the cost is heavy: the moral life is 
made less moral by making it less problematic. 
11 . Emma, vol. III, ch. vii . 
12 . Remembrance of Things Past, 2: 259-6 0, 1022 . 
13 . The Claverings , Ch. xxii. 
14. "Relevance" is a word that calls out for analysis. Clearly, a 
modulation that introduces more coherence into experience -- that 
eliminates inconsistencies and so reduced cognitive dissonance --
5 3  
i s  relevant. But this is a topic that requires another paper. 
15 . Mr. Justice Bazelon's recent address at the 1981 annual meeting 
of the American Psychological Association is a good example of 
the way a modulation can start. Relying on his long experience 
hearing cases in which psychological "experts" testify, the judge 
discussed what he called the "sins" of the profession : a 
tendency to make "conclusory pronouncements , "  a failure to 
"expose the facts under their conclusions" and "the values 
underlying their choice of facts, "  and a failure to "come clean 
on the uncertainties of opinion that may exist • • •  II The fact 
that extensive excerpts from the address have been printed in the 
APA Monitor, (vol. 12, no. 10) shows that this modulation is 
beginning to spread, though it is far from clear that it will 
eventually take on. 
16 . Eth. Nie. , 1109a 26-27 , 1109b 22-23 . 
17 . In an important essay , "Ruthlessness in Public Life" (Moral 
Questions, pp. 75-90), Thomas Nagel has distinguished between 
what he calls "concern with what will happen" and "concern with 
what one is doing." As I see it, the latter sort of concern is 
predominant in private roles , the former in public roles. 
18 . K. Vorlander, Immanuel Kant (Meiner, Leipzig , 1924), 2: 3 3 1 .  
19 . In the following discussion I will use the term "student" as a 
convenient shorthand to ref er to the whole group of which 
students probably form the maj ority but which also includes many 
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faculty members and some trustees. Similarly, as regards the 
term "trustee." 
20. The Sullivan formula, so-called because it was worked up by the
Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, a director of General Motors, consists of
a set of six "principles" that define equal employment practices 
for U.S. companies doing business in South Africa. More than a 
hundred firms have accepted these principles and agreed to report 
regularly on their progress in putting them into effect. 
21. Of course symbolic behaviors occur in connection with the
performance of many public roles for instance, swearing-in 
ceremonies, donning a black cap, saluting the flag. But such
symbolic behaviors function in a very different way from the way
in which symbolic behaviors function in private roles. So far
from now being expressive of the inner attitudes of those making
these gestures, the gestures have been transformed in the course
of time into ritualized elements in a means/end nexus. 
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